The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Reply to Critics
William A. Fletchert
During the past dozen years the original meaning of the Eleventh Amendment has become a matter of active controversy, both
among legal scholars and among the justices of the Supreme
Court.' Modern Eleventh Amendment doctrine remains governed
by the traditional view, which in gross outline holds that the
amendment is a jurisdictional bar prohibiting the federal courts
from hearing unconsented suits brought against states by out-ofstate citizens or by foreign citizens or subjects. 2 The principle from
which the amendment derives, though not the text of the amendment, similarly bars unconsented suits brought by in-state citizens. 3 The amendment's bar may be avoided or overcome in a
number of ways, the most significant of which are suits against individual state officers for prospective relief,4 Congressional abrogation of the amendment by explicit statutory language,5 and volun-

t Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall). B.A.
Harvard, 1968; B.A. Oxford, 1970; J.D. Yale, 1975. I wish to thank my friends Akhil Amar,
Vicki Jackson, Lawrence Marshall, William Marshall, and Calvin Massey for their valuable
criticisms and comments on this article. I hardly need add the customary disclaimer that
the conclusions I reach are not shared by all of those to whom I owe thanks.
I Justice Brennan, along with Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, has argued for
a change in Eleventh Amendment doctrine based on the new historical understanding of the
amendment. See Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan
dissenting); Welch v Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation,483 US
468, 478-95 (1987) (Brennan dissenting). The other five justices have declined to acknowledge the validity of this historical understanding, or to incorporate it into modern law.
Welch, 483 US at 468 (Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor); Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co.,
109 S Ct 2273, 2296 (1989) (Scalia and Kennedy).
Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 662-63, 677-78 (1974).
'Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 10 (1890). The principle assumed to be behind the
amendment has also been held to bar suits brought against states by foreign countries, Principality of Monaco v Mississippi, 292 US 313 (1934), and suits brought against states in
admiralty, Ex parte New York (No. 1), 256 US 490 (1921).
' Ex parte Young, 209 US 123 (1908); Edelman v Jordan,415 US at 651. The Court
has recently held that the power under Ex parte Young to order prospective relief extends
only to federal law claims. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89,
106 (1984).
' Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co., 109 S Ct at 2273.
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tary appearance by the state.'
Beginning with Professor Martha Field in 1978,1 a number of
legal academics challenged the traditional view of the amendment.'
Now, a little more than a decade later, a new view of what the
amendment was originally intended to accomplish has gained significant acceptance in the academic community9 and on the Court.
The new view has been called, in shorthand fashion, the "diversity
theory." 10 Given the significant policy and doctrinal consequences
that might result from a new understanding of the amendment's
original meaning, and given the normal academic sport of challeng6 Gunter v Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 200 US 273, 284 (1906); Clark v
Barnard, 108 US 436, 447-48 (1883). Subdivisions of states, such as counties and municipalities, are not. protected by the amendment. Lincoln County v Luning, 133 US 529, 530
(1890); Workman v New York City, 179 US 552, 565 (1900). Further, the United States
Supreme Court may hear appeals of suits brought against the states in state court. Cohens v
Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264 (1821).
Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U Pa L Rev 515 (1978) ("Field I"); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit
Upon the States, 126 U Pa L Rev 1203 (1978) ("Field 11").
' William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction,35 Stan L Rev 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 Colum L Rev 1889 (1983);
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L J 1425 (1987); and Vicki C.
Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity,
98 Yale L J 1 (1988). In addition, Professor Nowak has argued in favor of a theory of Congressional abrogation. John E. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes
of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 Colum L Rev 1413 (1975). While Professor Nowak's historical thesis has
not gained wide acceptance, I have found much of his original research very helpful. See also
Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separationof Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv L Rev 682,
693-700 (1976) (arguing in favor of Congressional abrogation).
I See the following comments on the new view: Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty
and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment after Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12
Hastings Const L Q 643, 652 (1985) ("persuasively developed" view); Allen K. Easley, The
Supreme Court and the Eleventh Amendment: Mourning the Lost Opportunity to Synthesize Conflicting Precedents,64 Denver U L Rev 485, 488 (1988) ("conclusion makes sense");
H. Stephen Harris, Jr. and Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence after
Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes of Action Over
Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 Emory L J 645, 654 (1988)
("persuasive" and "cogent" argument); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh
Amendment and the Pennhurst'Case, 98 Harv L Rev 61, 68 (1984) ("fully persuasive");
Keith Werhan, Pullman Abstention after Pennhurst A Comment on Judicial Federalism,
27 Wm & Mary L Rev 449, 460 n 46 (1986) ("a more sophisticated reading of the Eleventh
Amendment"); and Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 175 n 8 (Foundation,
2d ed 1988) ("a powerful argument").
10 William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical
Evaluation, 102 Harv L Rev 1372, 1373 (1989).
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ing the received (or, in this case, the almost received) wisdom, it is
not surprising that the new view has itself come under attack.
In this essay I defend the most plausible version of the "diversity explanation" against three recent attacks." ("Explanation"
seems to me a more appropriate term than "theory." Seeking a historical understanding of the Eleventh Amendment is not a particularly theoretical enterprise. As I view it, the task is to arrive at the
best explanation of what the adopters intended, based on the
known historical facts and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from them.) Not surprisingly, the version of the diversity
explanation that I defend is very similar to that which I elaborated
several years ago. 1 2 But the work of later scholars has induced me
to modify my opinions on a few points, and in some instances
where I have not changed my opinions, the work of others has
added new support to my original view.
Everyone agrees that the Eleventh Amendment was adopted
to overturn the result the Supreme Court reached in Chisholm v
Georgia' in 1793. The plaintiff in Chisholm was a citizen of South
Carolina who had sued the state of Georgia on a contract in a common law assumpsit action. The suit was brought in the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The source of jurisdiction was
the provision in Article III of the United States Constitution extending the federal judicial power to "controversies ... between a

State and Citizens of another State,"' 4 and a possibly unnecessary
parallel provision in § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.11 The Supreme Court in Chisholm construed the Article III provision to
mean that it had jurisdiction to hear Chisholm's damage action
against Georgia, and held by a four to one vote that any sovereign
immunity defense the state might otherwise have had was thereby
1 Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and th e Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56
U Chi L Rev 61 (1989); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 Harv L Rev 1342 (1989); and W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1372 (cited in note
10).

12 Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1033 (cited in note 8).

,3 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793). An excellent historical description of the case is in Doyle
Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement, 54 J Am Hist 19 (1967). An
excellent history of the case in a larger context is in Clyde Edward Jacobs, The Eleventh
Amendment and Sovereign Immunity (Greenwood, 1972). In addition, historical analysis
specifically supporting the diversity explanation is in Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1430 (cited in
note 8); Field 1, 126 U Pa L Rev at 515 (cited in note 7); Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1054
(cited in note 8); Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1920 (cited in note 8); and Jackson, 98 Yale L
J at 44-51 (cited in note 8). See also Nowak, 75 Colum L Rev at 1422 (cited in note 8), for
historical analysis arguing for a theory of Congressional abrogation.
US Const, Art III, § 2, cl 1.
'5 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 13, Stat 73, 1 80.
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abrogated. The Eleventh Amendment overruled the Court's decision in Chisholm, providing that "[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.""
Briefly stated, the diversity explanation is that the Eleventh
Amendment was designed to overrule Chisholm by eliminating the
state-citizen diversity jurisdiction from Article III. In more complicated but more precise terms, the amendment required that the
state-citizen diversity clause be construed to authorize jurisdiction
only when the state was a plaintiff; when the state was a defendant, the clause was not to be construed to authorize jurisdiction. In
the words of Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v Bank of United
States, the Eleventh Amendment "has its full effect, if the constitution be construed as it would have been construed, had the jurisdiction of the Court never been extended to suits brought against a
State, by the citizens of another State, or by aliens."'17 So understood, the Eleventh Amendment was not intended to eliminate or
restrict other heads of jurisdiction. If jurisdiction existed over a
suit against a state under the admiralty jurisdiction or the federal
question jurisdiction before the passage of the amendment, such
jurisdiction continued to exist after its passage. There is substantial evidence to suggest that admiralty jurisdiction existed both
before and after the adoption of the amendment. Whether federal
question jurisdiction existed before the passage of the amendment
was unclear, however, and perforce remained so after its passage.
I. AN ABBREVIATED HISTORIcAL NARRATIVE

Before responding to the attacks on the diversity explanation,
I will set out in abbreviated fashion what I view as the most coherent narrative of the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. The
narrative is available piecemeal in greater detail in other accounts
of the amendment, 18 but it cannot be found in complete form in
any one of them. The following narrative combines what I view as
i6
'

US Const, Amend XI.
22 US (9 Wheat) 738, 857-58 (1824).
See particularly Jacobs, Eleventh Amendment at 3-74 (cited in note 13); Amar, 96

Yale L J at 1466-75 (cited in note 8); Field 1, 126 U Pa L Rev at 527-46 (cited in note 7);

Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1045-63 (cited in note 8); Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1895-1941
(cited in note 8); Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 13-51 (cited in note 8); Mathis, 54 J Am Hist at 2029 (cited in note 13); and Nowak, 75 Colum L Rev at 1422-41 (cited in note 8).
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the best elements of those accounts.
A. Adoption of the Amendment
The story begins with the adoption of the Constitution, which
assigned to the national government some of the powers that had
been retained by the states under the Articles of Confederation.
Among other things, the Constitution authorized a new system of
national courts. Article III authorized the exercise of the federal
judicial power under various heads of jurisdiction. These heads of
jurisdiction were of two kinds. First, some Article III provisions
conferred jurisdiction over certain subject matters. For example,
the federal courts were given jurisdiction over maritime cases and
over cases arising under federal law. 19 Second, some Article III provisions conferred jurisdiction because of the character of the parties. For example, the federal courts were given jurisdiction over
suits between citizens of different states.2 0 Two heads of this second type gave the federal courts jurisdiction over suits between
states and citizens of different states, and between states and citizens or subjects of foreign states. 1 These last two heads of jurisdiction, which I will refer to as "state-citizen diversity" jurisdiction, are critical to the story of the Eleventh Amendment.
There was some discussion of state-citizen diversity jurisdiction during the state ratification debates on the proposed Constitution.22 As one would expect, those who opposed the adoption of the
Constitution argued that state-citizen diversity jurisdiction would
subject the states to unconsented suits in violation of their sovereignty. For example, during the Virginia debates George Mason
pointed with alarm to anticipated litigation concerning disputed
land claims in western Virginia: "Let gentlemen look at the westward. Claims respecting those lands, every liquidated account, or
19 US Const, Art III, § 2, cl1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority; ... to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction ...... "). See also 28 USC § 1331 (1982) (federal question jurisdiction) and §
1333 (1982) (admiralty jurisdiction).
20 US Const, Art III, § 2, cl 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend... to Controversies...
between Citizens of different States ...... "). See also 28 USC § 1332 (1982).
21 US Const, Art III, § 2, cl 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend.., to Controversies ...
between a State and Citizens of another State; ...and between a State... and foreign . . .
Citizens or Subjects.").
22 Description of the discussion is in Jacobs, Eleventh Amendment at 27-40 (cited in
note 13); Field I, 126 U Pa L Rev at 527-36 (cited in note 7); Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at
1045-54 (cited in note 8);Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1902-14 (cited in note 8);and Nowak,
75 Colum L Rev at 1423-30 (cited in note 8).
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other claim against this state, will be tried before the federal court.
Is not this disgraceful? '23 The anti-Federalist, "Brutus," wrote in
the New York Journal,
I conceive the [state-citizen diversity] clause ...

improper in

itself, and will, in its exercise, prove most pernicious and destructive. It is improper, because it subjects a state to answer
in a court of law, to the suit of an individual .... Every state
in the union is largely indebted to individuals .

. .

. If the

power of the judicial under this clause will extend to the cases
above stated, it will, if executed, produce the utmost confusion, and in its progress, will crush the states beneath its
weight. And if it does not extend to these cases, I confess myself utterly at a loss to give it any meaning.24
The response of the Constitution's supporters was divided.
Some argued that the clause would subject the states to suit, and
that this was a point in its favor. For example, Edmund Randolph
in Virginia argued that the clause would "render valid and effective existing claims, and secure that justice, ultimately, which is to
be found in every regular government."25 Others contended that
the clause would not subject the states to suit. For example, both
John Marshall and James Madison in Virginia contended that it
should be construed as conferring jurisdiction only when the state
was a plaintiff, bringing suit against an out-of-state citizen; when
the state was a defendant, sued by an out-of-state plaintiff, the
clause would have no effect. 6 Without fully explaining the basis
23 Jonathan Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 526-27 (J. B. Lippincott, 1901) ("Elliot'sDebates").
24 Essays of Brutus, in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 358,
429-31 (U Chicago, 1981); William Jeffrey, Jr., The Letters of "Brutus"-A Neglected Element in the Ratification Campaign of 1787-88, 40 U Cin L Rev 643, 754-57 (1971).
25 3 Elliot's Debates at 573 (cited in note 23).
26 Madison argued:
Its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of another state is much
objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call
any state into court. The only operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to
bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal court. This will
give satisfaction to individuals, as it will prevent citizens, on whom a state may have a
claim, being dissatisfied with the state courts.
Id at 533 (emphasis added). Marshall argued:
I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal
court. Is there no such case at present? Are there not many cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued? It is not rational to suppose
that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable
states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. I contend this construction is warranted by the words. But, say they, there will be partiality in it if a state
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for his conclusion, Alexander Hamilton in New York argued in
Federalist 81 that state public securities issued to finance the
Revolution could not be enforced in federal court, even if assigned
to out-of-state citizens."
Many of the state ratifying conventions approved the new
Constitution only with the understanding that certain amendments would be made. Among the amendments proposed by Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island was one that would have
eliminated the state-citizen diversity jurisdiction. 8 An identical
amendment was proposed to the ratifying convention in New York
but was not approved." Massachusetts and New Hampshire proposed a similar (or perhaps identical) amendment, but the text of
the proposals has not been preserved.30 During the first Congress,
many of the amendments proposed by the state conventions were
introduced, ultimately resulting in the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina proposed an amendment that would have eliminated the state-citizen
diversity jurisdiction, but the proposal failed to gain enough support to be referred to the full House."'
Section thirteen of the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted original
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in state-citizen diversity cases.3 2
So far as the record reveals, this section of the act was adopted
cannot be defendant-if an individual cannot proceed to obtain judgement against a
state, though he may be sued by a state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be
avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does not prevent its being
plaintiff.
Id at 555-56 (emphasis added).
27 Federalist 81 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers 481, 487-88
(New Am Lib, 1961). Hamilton's comments were almost certainly intended to respond to
"Brutus." See Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1047-48 n 63 (cited in note 8); and Jeffrey, 40 U
Cin L Rev at 755 n 62 (cited in note 24). See also Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1910-11
(cited in note 8).
28 3 Elliot's Debates at 660-61 (Virginia) (cited in note 23); 4 Elliot's Debates at 246
(North Carolina); 2 DocumentaryHistory of the Constitutionof the United States 317 (US
Department of State, 1894) (Rhode Island). Rhode Island's proposal would also have explicitly forbidden suits for the payment of a state's public securities. Id.
28 2 Elliot's Debates at 207, 409 (cited in note 23).
SOSt. George Tucker, 1 Blackstone's Commentaries: with Notes of Reference, to the
Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and the Commonwealth of Virginia 352 and n * (Birch and Small, 1803) ("Tucker's Blackstone").
31 1 Annals of Congress 791-92 (Aug 18, 1789), discussed in Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at
1052-53 (cited in note 8).
22 "[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil
nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also
between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 13, 1 Stat 73, 80.
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without discussion.33 Section nine of the Judiciary Act conferred
original admiralty jurisdiction on the district courts.3 4 The Judiciary Act did not confer original federal question jurisdiction, however.35 The only federal question jurisdiction was conferred by
§ 25, which gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over decisions by the state courts where a federal question had been
raised and decided adversely to the federal right asserted.3
Chisholm v Georgia3 7 was brought under the state-citizen diversity clause of Article III and § 13 of the Judiciary Act. The suit
was based on an asserted debt owed by the state of Georgia to a
South Carolina merchant, Robert Farquhar, on a contract under
which Farquhar had provided supplies to Georgia during the
Revolution. At Farquhar's death, the debt was not paid. His executor, Chisholm, eventually filed suit in assumpsit in the Supreme
Court, relying on state-citizen diversity. Chisholm did not assert a
Contracts Clause claim or any other federal claim of right.
The Supreme Court held, four to one, that Georgia could be
required to appear to defend the suit. Chief Justice Jay and Justices Blair, Cushing, and Wilson agreed that an action of assumpsit
would lie against the state of Georgia under the Court's state-citizen diversity jurisdiction. 8 None of the four justices discussed the
statutory conferral of that jurisdiction in § 13 of the Judiciary Act.
It is not clear whether they thought § 13 so plainly conferred jurisdiction that discussion was unnecessary, or whether they thought
the constitutional authorization of Article III self-executing, and
§ 13 therefore superfluous.
Justice Iredell dissented, focusing on the state-citizen diversity
jurisdiction conferred by § 13 .3 That section conferred "original
but not exclusive" jurisdiction in state-citizen diversity cases.40 According to Iredell, this language meant that the Supreme Court
had concurrent jurisdiction with the state of Georgia, and consequently that the Supreme Court could take jurisdiction of an as" Fletcher,

35 Stan L Rev at 1053-54 (cited in note 8).
" Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 9, 1 Stat 73, 76-77.
11 The Federalist-dominated Congress did pass a general original federal question jurisdictional statute in 1801, but it was repealed the following year after the Jeffersonians
gained control. Act of February 13, 1801, ch 4, § 11, 2 Stat 89, 92, repealed by Act of March
8, 1802, ch 8, § 1, 2 Stat 132. A new general original federal question jurisdictional statute
was finally passed in 1875. Act of March 3, 1875, ch 137, § 1, 18 Stat 470.
36 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, §25, 1 Stat 73, 85-87.
3 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793).
Id at *479 (Jay), *452 (Blair), *469 (Cushing) and *466 (Wilson).
Id at *429 (Iredell dissenting).
40 Id at *431.

Eleventh Amendment

1989]

1269

sumpsit case against the state only if Georgia would take jurisdiction of such a case.41 Since the state courts of Georgia would not
take jurisdiction, the jurisdiction could not be "concurrent," and
therefore the Supreme Court could not hear the case under § 13.42
Justice Iredell declined to answer the question whether the Supreme Court could take jurisdiction over a case based on a federal
statute specifically conferring jurisdiction, where Congress deemed
such a law "necessary and proper to carry the purposes of this constitution into full effect. ' 4- Iredell noted, however, that he had
strong doubts about the constitutional power of Congress ever to
authorize unconsented suits against a state "for the recovery of
money," since "every word in the constitution may have its full
44
effect, without involving this consequence.
On February 19, 1793, one day after the Court announced its
decision in Chisholm, Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts introduced a proposed amendment in the House that
would have flatly prohibited a state from being made a defendant
in a suit brought by a private individual:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in
any of the judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the suit of
any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic
or corporate, whether
45
within or without the United States.
41 Id at *436-37.
41

Id at *437-49.

43 Id at *432, *436.
44 Id at *449-50.

" PennsylvaniaJournal and Weekly Advertiser 1, col 2 (Feb 27, 1793). Judge Gibbons
doubts the existence of Sedgwick's proposed amendment because there is no record of it in
the Annals of Congress, and because he has been unable to find any evidence of it in the
National Archives. Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1926 n 186 (cited in note 8). Charles Warren quotes Sedgwick's proposed amendment without giving either Sedgwick's name or a
source. Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History 101 (Little, Brown,
1923). Professor Nowak quotes the amendment, crediting Representative Sedgwick, and citing the Pennsylvania Journalof February 20, 1793. Nowak, 75 Colum L Rev at 1436 n 132
(cited in note 8). (I have been unable to locate the Pennsylvania Journal, but have confirmed the information in the Pennsylvania Journaland Weekly Advertiser of February 27,
1793. It is possible that Professor Nowak's citation is slightly mistaken, and that we are
citing the same source.)
I have little doubt that Sedgwick introduced the proposed amendment. The Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, published "every Wednesday," contained a day-by-day
record of the proceedings in Congress. As part of its entry for the House of Representatives
for Tuesday, February 19, it recounts the following:
Mr. Sedgwick, after some introductory observations relative to a decision of the Judges
of the Supreme Court, made yesterday, respecting the liability of states to be sued by
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The next day a different proposal was introduced in the House by
a representative whose name has not come down to us. Unlike
Sedgwick's proposal, this one focused only on out-of-state citizens
and foreigners, paralleling the state-citizen jurisdiction of Article
IIl:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to
any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by
citizens or subjects of any foreign State.4 6
Congress adjourned less than a month later without acting on either proposal.
When Congress reconvened almost a year later, the text of
what would become the Eleventh Amendment was introduced in
the Senate by an unknown senator on January 2, 1794:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit[] in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.4 7
The addition of the italicized words "be construed to" may be understood as clarifying the amendment. The second version, introduced in the prior session, had narrowed the focus of the amendment to the state-citizen diversity jurisdiction. This third version
made the focus even more precise by specifying that the amendment was designed to correct a misconstruction of the state-citizen
diversity clause in Chisholm. That is, the amendment made it clear
that the clause had originally meant what Marshall and Madison
individuals, and which decision is affirmative of that idea-made the following motion,
viz.
Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of both Houses concurring, that the following article be proposed to the legislatures of the several states, as an amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three fourths of the said
legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as parts of the said Constitution,
viz.
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the judicial
courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United
States, at the suit of any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner
or foreigners, of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United
States-laid on the table.
Pennsylvania Journaland Weekly Advertiser 1, col 2 (Feb 27, 1793).
3 Annals of Congress 651-52 (Feb 20, 1793).
4 Annals of Congress 25 (Jan 2, 1794) (emphasis indicates words added to the previous version; the bracket indicates an "s" omitted from the previous version).
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had contended it meant, and that it was not to be construed
otherwise.
Two further modifications were proposed in the Senate, 8 one
50
49
of which will be discussed in detail below. Both were defeated.
One further modification was proposed, and defeated, in the
House.5 1 The amendment was approved by the Senate in January,
1794, by the House in March,52 and by early 1795 had been ratified
by the requisite three-quarters majority of the states. 3
B. Meaning of the Amendment
The adopters of the amendment were concerned with the possibility of monetary judgments against the states. At that time,
such judgments were likely in three kinds of cases: private contract
suits against the states, primarily based on the public securities of
the states; suits disputing land titles, particularly in Virginia and
Georgia; and suits by British citizens under the peace treaty of
1783.
Chisholm was an example of the first kind of case, a suit on a
common law cause of action arising out of a contract. In a sense,
Chisholm was uncharacteristic of this kind of suit, for it was based
on an ordinary contract. The overwhelming majority of likely suits
were based on public securities issued by the states during the
Revolution. Such securities were of great concern to the states, as
indicated by Brutus's comment in the New York Journal.5 4 They

were largely held by out-of-state citizens and foreigners who had
bought them as speculators, at prices greatly below face value. 5 In
,sFirst, Senator Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania proposed a revision that would have
excepted from the operation of the amendment causes of action to enforce treaties. Second,
an unknown senator proposed a revision that would have confined the operation of the
amendment to causes of action arising after its ratification. 4 Annals of Congress 30-31 (Jan
14, 1794).
11 See text at notes 121-31 for discussion of the Gallatin proposal.
50 4 Annals of Congress 30 (Jan 14, 1794).
6'The proposed revision would have confined the operation of the amendment to suits
brought against states that had already "made provision in their own Courts, whereby such
suit may be prosecuted to effect." Id at 476 (March 4, 1794). That is, Chisholm would have
been overridden only when the state courts were opened to the claims that were eliminated
by the Eleventh Amendment.
52 Id at 477.
51Jacobs, Eleventh Amendment at 67 (cited in note 13).
See text at note 24.
Warren, The Supreme Court at 99 (cited in note 45); William G. Anderson, The
Price of Liberty: The Public Debt of the American Revolution 25 (U Virginia, 1983); E.
James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse 270-72, 341 (U North Carolina, 1961). I am indebted to Professor Lawrence Marshall for emphasizing the threat that the public securities
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the legal sense that is critical here, however, ordinary contract
suits like Chisholm and public securities suits were identical: both
were based on common law rather than upon federal law. That is,
neither suit could have been brought under federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts, even if such jurisdiction had been
conferred by statute.
There were two suits of the second kind, involving land title
disputes, pending in the Supreme Court when Chisholm was decided: Hollingsworth v Virginia5 and Moultrie v Georgia.57 Hollingsworth arose out of the land dispute that had concerned
George Mason during the ratification debates in Virginia. Several
Indian tribes had conveyed three million acres of land to the Indiana Company in 1768, and the Crown had approved the conveyance. 8 The Virginia legislature disapproved the grant in 1779, and
declared the land to be part of the public domain. Shareholders of
the Indiana Company, most of whom were citizens of Pennsylvania, filed suit in the Supreme Court in 1792.1' Moultrie arose out
of a contract under which Georgia agreed in 1789 to sell nearly 16
million acres of land to several land companies. Before the payment came due, the Georgia legislature passed a resolution requiring payment in specie. After one of the companies was unable to
make payment on those terms, Georgia treated the contract as no
longer binding and sold the land to another company.60 It is unclear whether Hollingsworth ever involved a federal claim of right,
or whether Moultrie was thought to involve a federal claim at the
time the Eleventh Amendment was adopted.'

cases presented to the states. L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1364-66 (cited in note 11).
56 Grayson v Virginia, 3 US (3 Dall) *320 (1796), dismissed as Hollingsworth v Virginia, 3 US (3 Dall) *378 (1798).
57 Unreported, discussed in Jacobs, Eleventh Amendment at 63-64 and n 83 (cited in
note 13).
Id at 57-58; Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1904 (cited in note 8).
Jacobs, Eleventh Amendment at 57-58 (cited in note 13).
60 Id at 63-64 and n 84. The land in question was the subject of the great Yazoo land
fraud, and later came before the Supreme Court under a subsequent contract to different
purchasers in Fletcherv Peck, 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See C. Peter MaGrath, Yazoo:
Land and Politics in the New Republic 101 (Brown U, 1966).
", The state confiscation challenged in Hollingsworth took place in 1779, before the
adoption of the Constitution. The state action in Moultrie all took place after the adoption
of the Constitution. Although the Supreme Court eventually decided in Fletcher v Peck, 10
US at 87, that a state would violate the Contract Clause (US Const, Art I, § 10, cl 1) by
legislative repudiation of a contract with a private individual, Professor Wright argues that
the clause was originally understood to protect only contracts between private parties from
impairment by the states. Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the Con-

stitution 15-21 (Harvard, 1938).
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The third kind of suit involved claims under the peace treaty
with Great Britain. 2 The treaty prohibited the states from imposing impediments to the recovery of outstanding debts, and prohibited future escheats of British and loyalist property.6 3 Claims
against the states under the treaty involved enormous amounts of
money, sought by loyalists and British subjects, at a time when
political tension with Britain was high.14 Vassall v Massachusetts,6 5 a claim by a loyalist whose property had been confiscated,
was filed a few months after the Court's decision in Chisholm. 6a
We may assume that suits against states seeking recovery of debts
and challenging escheats of property would have been federal
question suits under Article III since they were brought pursuant
to a treaty. 7
With these suits in the background, what are we to make of
the text of the amendment? Some of the suits involved only common law; some possibly involved federal law; and some almost certainly involved federal law. Ordinary contract suits-of which
Chisholm is an example-were based on general common law
rather than federal law. Congress had no power to authorize the
federal courts to hear suits like Chisholm under the federal question jurisdiction even if it had wished to do so.6 8 Land disputes

"2Definitive Treaty

of Peace Between the United States of America and his Brittanic

Majesty, 8 Stat 80 (1783) ("Treaty of Paris"). For the provisional treaty see 8 Stat 54 (Nov
30, 1782).
C3 Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1899-1902 (cited in note 8); L. Marshall, 102 Harv L
Rev at 1356-60 (cited in note 11); and Warren, 1 The Supreme Court at 99 (cited in note

45).
" Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1927-30 (cited in note 8); L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev
at 1358 (cited in note 11); and Nowak, 75 Colum L Rev at 1438-39 (cited in note 8).
65 Unreported, discussed in Jacobs, Eleventh Amendment at 60-62 (cited in note 13);
Julius Goebel, Jr., 1 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and
Beginnings to 1801 734-35 (Macmillan, 1971).
"CProcess was served in June, 1793. Id at 734; L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1357 n
62 (cited in note 11).
67 Article III provides that the federal judicial power extends to cases arising under
"the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority." US Const, Art III, § 2, cl 1. The Treaty of Paris was entered into before the
Constitution was adopted, but the language of Article III-"made, or which shall be
made"-seems to include both existing and future treaties. The Treaty of Paris was signed
"under the authority" of the "United States," by that name. Treaty of Paris, 8 Stat 54
(cited in note 62).
"' There was some uncertainty in the early years about whether the law in diversity
cases heard by the federal courts was federal law within the meaning of the Supremacy
Clause. See, for example, 1 Tucker's Blackstone at 379-80 (cited in note 30); William A.
Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv L Rev 1513, 1521-27 (1984); and Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U Pa L Rev 1231, 1255-67 (1985). But it was
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possibly involved federal law-and after Fletcher v Peck6 9 in 1810
certainly would have involved federal law if based on a contract
directly with the state. Finally, treaty-based suits involved federal
law sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction in the federal
courts.
There are two ways to understand what the adopters of the
amendment intended. The first is to read the amendment as forbidding all suits against states by out-of-state citizens and foreign
citizens or subjects. The second is to read the amendment as failing to authorize jurisdiction, by requiring a narrow construction of
the affirmative grant of party-based jurisdiction; that is, after the
amendment, the state-citizen diversity clause authorizes jurisdiction when a state is a plaintiff but not when it is a defendant.
Under the first reading, there can be no federal court jurisdiction
even if the suit is brought under federal question jurisdiction.
Under the second reading, federal court jurisdiction exists whenever there is an implementing statute authorizing federal question
jurisdiction and the suit satisfies the criteria of that head of jurisdiction. Under either reading of the amendment, admiralty jurisdiction is not forbidden, for the amendment refers only to suits "in
law and equity." Thus, whether the language is read as "forbidding" or merely "failing to authorize," admiralty is not affected. °
The second reading seems to me far more likely than the first.
The state-citizen diversity clause of Article III authorized jurisdiction in all three kinds of cases in which monetary judgments were
sought against the states; eliminating that clause from the Constitution required the dismissal of those cases. Since there was no
never thought that such common law, even if supreme federal law, was a basis for jurisdiction under federal question jurisdiction. See, for example, Peter S. Du Ponceau, A Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the Jurisdictionof the Courts of the United States xivxv (Small, 1824).
"' 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
The early case law seems to have understood the amendment as not affecting admiralty jurisdiction. Justice Washington, sitting on circuit, held that admiralty was unaffected.
United States v Bright, 24 F Cases 1232, 1234 (D Pa Cir, 1809). The Supreme Court
avoided answering the question on three separate occasions. United States v Peters, 9 US (5
Cranch) 115 (1809); Governor of Georgia v Madrazo, 26 US (1 Pet) *110 (1828); and Ex
parte Madrazzo, 32 US (7 Pet) 627 (1833). Peter Du Ponceau and Joseph Story both read
the amendment as not affecting admiralty. Peter S. Du Ponceau, A Brief View of the Constitution of the United States 37-38 (E.G. Dorsey, 1834); Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States 560-61 (Hilliard, Gray, 1833, reprinted Da Capo
Press, 1970).
Professor Lawrence Marshall concedes that admiralty jurisdiction is not affected by the
Eleventh Amendment. L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1355 n 53 (cited in note 11). Neither
Professor William Marshall nor Professor Massey discusses admiralty jurisdiction.
7o
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original federal question jurisdiction statute, there was no other
basis upon which they could be brought originally in federal court.
Whether private suits against the states could have been authorized by a federal question statute was not, in my view, intended to
be resolved by the Eleventh Amendment. A more detailed argument in favor of this reading of the amendment may be found in
my earlier article, 71 and arguments going in the same direction, indeed further, may be found in other articles. 72 Additional (and
somewhat selective) elaboration appears in my responses below to
the three recent articles that attack this reading of the
amendment.
II.

RESPONSE TO CRITICS

Two of the critics, Professors Lawrence Marshall and Calvin
Massey, adopt variations on what may be termed a "plain language
reading" of the amendment. In their view, the language of the
amendment is very clear in its intent to forbid jurisdiction when an
out-of-state citizen or a foreign citizen or subject sues a state. They
contend that none of the "revisionists 73 has sufficiently demonstrated that this is such an implausible intent that we should
abandon the meaning clearly manifested by the text of the amendment. I disagree with Professors Lawrence Marshall and Massey,
both as to whether the text of the amendment has the clear meaning they impute to it, and as to what the amendment was intended
to accomplish.
The third critic, Professor William Marshall, believes that the
language of the amendment is not clear, but he argues that the
"diversity theorists '74 have not sufficiently established their thesis
that the adopters of the amendment specifically intended to leave
unimpaired the federal question head of jurisdiction. I substantially agree with many of Professor William Marshall's arguments,
but, as I will show, the diversity explanation is fully consistent
with them.
11

Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1045-87 (cited in note 8).

12

SeeAmar, 96 Yale L J at 1466-92 (cited in note 8). Judge Gibbons states: "The

immediacy of the foreign affairs crisis at the time of the drafting of the amendment and the
related Federalist concern with enforcing the peace treaty makes clear that the amendment
was not intended to remove from federal purview suits against states in which federal question jurisdiction had been invoked." Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1894 (cited in note 8,
emphasis in original).
71 Massey, 56 U Chi L Rev at 62, 63-65 (cited in note 11).
71 W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1373, 1395-96 (cited in note 10).
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Response to Professors Lawrence Marshall and Massey
1.

The "plain meaning of the text."

Professor Lawrence Marshall has no doubt about what the
text of the amendment means. At several places, he refers to the
"plain meaning of the text," 5 to the "essentially unambiguous dictates of the amendment's language, "' 6 and to the "exceptional clarity" of the amendment.7 According to Professor Lawrence Marshall, the plain meaning is that the "amendment precludes federal
jurisdiction over 'any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.' Thus, even
if an out-of-state citizen brings the case under the federal question
head of jurisdiction, the suit is barred. 78 Professor Massey is
slightly less emphatic, but shares Professor Marshall's view of the
import of the language. He proposes that we take the amendment's
"text and the history of its enactment at face value, 7' 9 and contends that those who argue for the diversity explanation of the
amendment "are required to amend its text in order to deliver
their desired meaning."' 0 Professor Massey claims that the
"amendment sought to create a party-based denial of jurisdiction
to the federal courts that sweeps across all the jurisdictional heads
of Article III."'
The problem is that the text does not clearly mean what
Professors Marshall and Massey think it does. Indeed, based on
almost-contemporary usage, one can argue that the text is clear,
but with the meaning for which the revisionists argue. On February 8, 1805, Senator Breckenridge of Kentucky introduced a proposed amendment to the Constitution that would have substantially limited the federal courts' jurisdiction.82 Breckenridge's
amendment was not adopted; and it was proposed in each of the
1' L.

Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1371 (cited in note 11).
16 Id at 1343.
7 Id at 1349.
78 Id at 1346.
'9 Massey, 56 U Chi L Rev at 65 (cited in note 11).
80 Id at 115.
81 Id at 65 (emphasis in original).
82 14 Annals of Congress 53 (Feb 8, 1805). Senator Breckenridge was no neophyte at
changing the jurisdictional structure of the federal courts. Three years earlier, he had introduced the legislation that repealed the short-lived original federal question jurisdiction created by the Federalists in 1801. Debates in the Congress of the United States, on the Bill
for Repealing the Law "For the More Convenient Organizationof the Courts of the United
States" 5 (Whiting, Leavenworth & Whiting, 1802).
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succeeding two years in the Congress, in substantially the same
words, also without success.83 But its text tells us a great deal
about the Eleventh Amendment. In its entirety, Breckenridge's
proposed amendment read as follows: "The judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to controversies between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of
different states, between citizens of the same State, claiming lands
under grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens, or subjects." 4
The wording of Breckenridge's amendment-"the judicial
power shall not be construed to extend"-is identical to that of the
Eleventh Amendment.8 " Yet we know that the proposed amendment was not designed to prohibit federal question jurisdiction
whenever the parties were aligned in the specified ways. I take as
my example the citizen-citizen diversity jurisdiction, although the
point could be made using any of the other specified heads of jurisdiction."8 The proposed amendment clearly intended a repeal of
the citizen-citizen diversity jurisdiction rather than a prohibition
of federal court jurisdiction whenever a citizen of one state sued a
citizen of another state. A strong argument in favor of this reading
is based on reason and common sense. If we read the proposed
amendment as prohibiting jurisdiction whenever a citizen of one
state sued a citizen of another, we would have the unlikely, even
impossible, result of federal question suits being barred whenever
"115 Annals of Congress 68 (Jan 22, 1806) (Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania); 16 Annals of Congress 76 (Feb 20, 1807) (Senator Clay of Kentucky). I am grateful to Professors
Amar and Massey for unearthing these proposed amendments, of which I was unaware when
I wrote my earlier article. See Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1482-83 n 233 (cited in note 8); Massey,
56 U Chi L Rev 118 and n 294 (cited in note 11). I apologize for now using them, somewhat
ungratefully, against Professor Massey.
" 14 Annals of Congress 53 (Feb 8, 1805).
" "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
...."US Const, Amend XI. Breckenridge's language omits the word "any," but I do not
understand that omission to change the linguistic analysis. The prohibition on jurisdiction,
if any, would result from the words "shall not be construed to extend." The argument for
reading the amendment as a prohibition is essentially an argument stemming from the failure of the drafters to add words such as "when jurisdiction is based on party alignment."
See, for example, Massey, 56 U Chi L Rev at 115 (cited in note 11). Professor L. Marshall
emphasizes the word "any" in arguing that the amendment prohibits jurisdiction, but thinks
his reading proper "[elven without regard to the word 'any[.]"' L. Marshall, 102 Harv L
Rev at 1347 (cited in note 11).
88 Note that the first clause of Breckenridge's proposed amendment provided that the
judicial power should not be construed to extend to "controversies between a State and
citizens of another State." This clause would have fully repealed the state-citizen diversity
clause. The Eleventh Amendment effectuated a repeal only in suits in which the states were
defendants.
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the suit was between diverse citizens, and permitted whenever the
suit was between citizens of the same state. In other words, federal
question suits would have been confined to the state courts in precisely those instances where there was the most reason to distrust
the state courts, and permitted in the federal courts when the state
courts could be most trusted.
Fortunately, we are not left to rely solely on our reconstruction of the proposed amendment's reasonable intent. We have, in
addition, a contemporaneous gloss. On December 26, 1806, Representative James Elliot of Vermont introduced a resolution supporting the proposed amendment. Elliot characterized the amendment
as confining the federal courts' jurisdiction to federal question
cases, suits in admiralty, and a few other categories of suits."7
Thus, Elliot's resolution makes clear that diversity as a basis for
jurisdiction was to be eliminated, but that federal question jurisdiction was to be preserved in its entirety.88
Breckenridge's proposed amendment is, to our ear, linguistically deficient in the same way as the Eleventh Amendment. If I
were writing the proposed amendment or the Eleventh Amendment today, and wished them only to repeal the citizen-citizen or
state-citizen diversity heads of jurisdiction, I would write them differently. For example, I would readily adopt language such as that
proposed by either Professor Lawrence Marshall89 or Professor
Massey,"0 making explicit that federal jurisdiction over parties in
81 Elliot "presented to the House... a resolution... concurring with the resolutions of
the State of Kentucky, proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
'for confining the judiciary power of the Courts of the United States to cases in law and
equity, arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
which shall be made under their authority; ... [and] cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ....... 16 Annals of Congress 216 (Dec 26, 1806).
88 Professor Massey discusses Breckenridge's proposed amendment, and concedes that
it is "anomalous" to read the Eleventh Amendment as prohibiting jurisdiction while reading
Breckenridge's amendment as merely repealing a previous grant of jurisdiction. Massey, 56
U Chi L Rev at 118 (cited in note 11). Professor Marshall does not mention the proposed
amendment. L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1342 (cited in note 11).
89 "There would surely be no arguments today had the amendment provided: 'The
clauses of the Constitution extending the judicial power to controversies between a state
and citizens of another state, and between a state and foreign citizens or subjects, shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States.' Dozens of other straightforward ways of conveying this message also
come to mind." L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1347 n 21 (cited in note 11).
10 "In revisionist parlance, the Eleventh Amendment reads: The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity founded upon a
diverse party head of jurisdiction, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Massey, 56 U Chi L Rev at 115 (cited in note 11) (emphasis in original).
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the specified alignment is not available when jurisdiction is based
on the character of the parties. The omission of the italicized
words, or words to that effect, indicates to the modern reader (or
at least to Professors Marshall and Massey) that jurisdiction is not
available when the parties are so aligned, even if some other head
of jurisdiction is available. Yet, as the Breckenridge amendment
proposed in 1805, 1806, and 1807 makes clear, the omission of
these words was understood at the time as no more than an
ellipsis.
2. Professor Lawrence Marshall's
against the diversity explanation.

non-textual

argument

Professor Lawrence Marshall's argument proceeds in two
steps. First, as noted above, he contends that the plain meaning of
the amendment prohibits federal court jurisdiction whenever an
out-of-state or foreign citizen sues a state. Second, he uses the clarity of the amendment's text as a sort of standard-of-proof argument, contending that "there are plausible explanations for why
the amendment reads as it does, and that there is, therefore, no
justification for discarding the plain meaning of the text."'" I have
already shown that, at the very least, the text of the amendment is
not clear. Indeed, I think I have shown that the text is moderately
clear, but with a meaning that supports the diversity explanation
rather than Professor Lawrence Marshall's explanation. If we understand the text as supporting the diversity explanation, Professor Lawrence Marshall must show that the reasons supporting his
reading are compelling rather than merely plausible, for he is arguing against rather than with the grain. But I think that Professor
Lawrence Marshall has not succeeded even in the task he set out
for himself.2
At a general level, I agree fully with Professor Lawrence Marshall. He argues that it is "unnecessary and inappropriate" to seek
to explain the Eleventh Amendment by "one value" that it implements, or by a "single theoretical principle. '93 He urges that we
91 L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1371 (cited in note 11) (emphasis in original).
92 Professor William Marshall agrees that Professor Lawrence Marshall has not established persuasive reasons for his reading of the amendment. He states that Professor Lawrence Marshall "valiantly attempts to make sense of the literal language of the eleventh
amendment," but "there is no persuasive reason why suits based upon federal law should be
allowed in federal court when brought by an in-stater, but should not be allowed in federal
court when brought by an out-of-stater." W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1378 and n 44
(cited in note 10).
11 L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1353 (cited in note 11) (emphasis in original).
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understand the amendment as a "balance between the competing
values of state immunity from federal suit and accountability to
the new federal system" that is "consistent with the political and
fiscal realities of the early and mid-1790's. 9 4 This approach seems
to me quite right." But after the general question is properly
framed, the particular question remains: What was the balance
that was actually struck by the amendment? It is in answering the
particular question that Professor Lawrence Marshall has gone
astray.
The linchpin of Professor Lawrence Marshall's argument is
that it would have been rational for the adopters of the amendment to bar out-of-staters and foreigners from suing states in federal courts, even when suit was brought under federal law, and at
the same time to permit in-staters to sue states in federal court
under federal law."6 Professor Lawrence Marshall's argument in
favor of this distinction rests on essentially two grounds.
a. Claims held by out-of-staters. First, Professor Lawrence
Marshall points out that at the time of the amendment's adoption,
out-of-staters held most of the obligations on which the states were
likely to be sued, and argues that the adopters therefore cared
most about forbidding suits by out-of-staters9 It is true that most
of the claims that worried the states were in the hands of out-ofstaters and foreigners, but this fact does not support Professor
Lawrence Marshall's reading of the amendment. To understand
the situation that faced the adopters, one must distinguish between claims brought under the common law or under state law,
and claims brought under federal law.
Many of the claims held by out-of-staters were not based on
federal law. This was clearly so for the private contract claim in
Chisholm; it was probably so for the contract claims brought on
the states' public securities, at least until a state legislature repudi9- Id at 1353, 1355.
91 Professor Lawrence Marshall contends that the "fallacy of the current eleventh
amendment theories lies in their relentless demand for a single theoretical principle that can
coherently explain the amendment." Id at 1353. I do not think that this is an accurate
description of the diversity explanation of the amendment.
" Professor Lawrence Marshall also argues that it would have been rational for the
adopters of the amendment to distinguish between foreign citizens or subjects on the one
hand, and foreign states on the other. L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1356-62 (cited in note
11). The twentieth century Supreme Court assimilated foreign countries to foreign citizens
or subjects in Principalityof Monaco v Mississippi, 292 US 313 (1934), but the distinction
between the two is not at issue here. No one arguing for the diversity explanation argues
against the distinction.
11 L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1362-71 (cited in note 11).
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ated the obligations; 98 and it was probably so for the claims in the
Indiana Land Company litigation in Hollingsworth v Virginia.9
These claims, based on non-federal law, are at the heart of the diversity explanation. Since the only possible basis for federal court
jurisdiction over them was the state-citizen diversity clause, eliminating that clause from the Constitution was a fully sufficient way
of preventing the federal courts from hearing them. There was no
need to prohibit the federal courts' jurisdiction, since there were
no federal questions involved that could have provided an alternative basis for jurisdiction.
Claims held by out-of-staters or foreigners based on federal
law were another matter. There were possibly a number of such
claims. After the Court held in Fletcher v Peck'00 in 1810 that the
Contract Clause extends to contracts in which a state is a party,
both the public securities claims against the states and the land
litigation in Moultrie v Georgia' would have involved claims
under federal law. Whether they were seen as federal question
cases at the time the amendment was adopted is unclear, but they
may have been seen as potential federal claims. Claims under the
1783 peace treaty with Britain were almost certainly federal
claims. All these claims were held in significant part by out-of-staters and foreigners, largely because of assignment by in-staters.
Professor Lawrence Marshall contends that it would have been rational for the adopters of the amendment to forbid these claims
when brought by out-of-staters and foreigners, but to permit them
when brought by in-staters. But this can hardly have been rational
if the states were concerned about the impact on their treasuries
(as everyone, including Professor Lawrence Marshall, concedes
they were), for those claims could easily have been assigned (or reassigned) to in-state citizens. 10 2
Professor Lawrence Marshall acknowledges the difficulty
posed by assignments, calling it a "perplexing problem."' 0 3 His initial response to the problem is to say that the "assignment ques"8As discussed above, it was not clear in the 1790s whether a state's repudiation of its
own contract could constitute a violation of the Contract Clause. See note 61.
11 Grayson v Virginia, 3 US (3 Dall) *320 (1796), dismissed as Hollingsworth v Virginia, 3 US (3 Dall) *378 (1798).
oo 10 US (6 Cranch) 87, 137 (1810).
101 Unreported, discussed in Jacobs, Eleventh Amendment at 63-64 and n 83 (cited in
note 13).
"02Professor William Marshall makes this point. W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1379
n 44 (cited in note 10).
1*3 L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1367 n 113 (cited in note 11).
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tion plagues all readings of the amendment." 104 It does not plague
the diversity explanation, however. Assignment is a perplexing
problem for Professor Lawrence Marshall because he needs to explain why the adopters would have gone to the trouble of prohibiting jurisdiction to protect state treasuries, while leaving open an
obvious way to enforce the claims against the states. Under the
diversity explanation, in-state and out-of-state citizens were
treated equally. Federal question jurisdiction existed for out-ofstaters and in-staters alike. Thus, assignment of claims based on
federal law was unnecessary, because no category of private claimant was forbidden to bring suit.10 5
Professor Lawrence Marshall also argues that the adopters of
the amendment might have thought that the Court would invalidate assignments to in-staters.1 0 6 He presents no evidence of contemporary understanding to support this view, and I know of none.
Finally, Professor Lawrence Marshall minimizes the assignment
difficulty by characterizing
the possibility of assignment as a
"small loophole[]. '"107 But it was not a small loophole. If assignment were possible, out-of-state speculators who had originally
bought state securities from in-staters could, by the simple assignment of the claim back to an in-stater, transform a largely worthless piece of paper into a security redeemable at par.'"5 We know
that the adopters were aware that there had once been an interstate market in these securities, for this market had given rise to
the very problem that worried them.10 9 We should assume that the
adopters, in attempting to resolve the problem, would have taken
into account the likelihood that there would be such a market
again.

104

Id.

105The difficulty for the diversity explanation is quite different. It must argue that the

adopters of the amendment would have left the states potentially vulnerable to suits under
federal law by all private parties, not merely by assignees of the claims. Fletcher, 35 Stan L
Rev at 1063-78 (cited in note 8);Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1899-1941 (cited in note 8).
See also notes 158-61, 171-72, and accompanying text.
106 L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1367 n 113 (cited in note 11).
107

Id.

The ability to assign claims was never in question. I am unaware of any case in
which the consequences of a bona fide assignment of a claim were avoided until Principality
of Monaco v Mississippi, 292 US 313 (1934). This was a twentieth century case, and the
avoidance of the claim was not accomplished by invalidation of the assignment; rather, it
was accomplished by expanding the prohibition of the amendment to foreign states.
109 L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1365 n 107, 1367 n 113 (cited in note 11). Congress
had understood that assignments could cause problems when it drafted the Judiciary Act of
1789, for the Act forbade using assignment to create citizen-citizen diversity jurisdiction.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 11, 1 Stat 73, 78-79.
10I
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b. Constitutionalrights. Second, Professor Lawrence Marshall
argues in favor of the distinction between in-staters and out-ofstaters on the ground that preserving federal question claims
brought against states by in-staters, and by the United States and
the individual states, protected the most important core of constitutional rights. 110 Such an argument might be plausible if the
amendment were adopted today, because of the constitutional
rights that have been created pursuant to the post-Civil War settlement, but it can hardly be plausible for an amendment adopted
in the 1790s. Many of the constitutional prohibitions against the
states were directed at preventing the states from discriminating
against out-of-staters. The Privileges and Immunities Clause is the
most obvious example."' Under Professor Lawrence Marshall's
reading of the Eleventh Amendment, the adopters prohibited federal judicial redress of constitutional violations by the states that
the national government was uniquely qualified to protect against.
It seems to me exceedingly unlikely that someone in the late eighteenth century would have intended this result, and Professor Lawrence Marshall gives us no direct evidence to support his conclusion that this was, in fact, intended." 2 Additionally, Professor
Lawrence Marshall argues that the jurisdiction that remained over
suits brought against states by the United States and by other
states would have sufficed to protect against state constitutional
violations such as coining money, entering into treaties, and violating the Contract Clause." 3 But he makes no showing either that
the United States and the states were thought to have causes of
action to redress such violations, or that the adopters of the
amendment had any such possibility in mind.
3. Professor Massey's non-textual argument against the diversity explanation.
It is difficult to decide how broadly to respond to Professor
Massey's attack on the "revisionist" explanation of the Eleventh
L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1367-68 (cited in note 11).
"I Professor Lawrence Marshall says only the following about the Privileges and Immunities Clause: "The creation of diversity jurisdiction and the privileges and immunities
clause is evidence of the framers' understanding that the mere enactment of the Constitution would not erase the allegiances and prejudices that had long developed along state
lines." L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1370 n 129 (cited in note 11).
"1 Professor William Marshall agrees. In his view, protecting the federal rights of instaters but not those of out-of-staters would have been "at best, ironic." W. Marshall, 102
Harv L Rev at 1378-79 n 44 (cited in note 10).
"' L. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1368 (cited in note 11).
10
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Amendment.114 He advances both an historical theory and a modern interpretation of the amendment, but is not entirely clear
where one leaves off and the other begins. Professor Massey makes
an historical argument that the amendment was intended to bar
suits against states in federal courts when brought by out-of-staters or foreigners." 5 He also states that it is somewhat uncertain
whether, as an historical matter, the adopters intended to prohibit
or permit suits brought by in-staters." 6 He then arrives at a comprehensive reading of the amendment purportedly based on its
history.
Under Professor Massey's view, the amendment's prohibition
of all suits brought against a state by out-of-staters or foreigners is
a constitutionally mandated denial of subject matter jurisdiction
that the state cannot waive by appearance and that Congress cannot override by legislation."1 For in-staters, by contrast, there is
no jurisdictional bar. Congress can authorize suits against states by
in-state citizens, limited only by the Tenth Amendment."' Professor Massey professes not to like this result, but argues that it is
compelled by history:
A rule that permits the states to violate the federal rights of
non-citizens and avoid direct accountability in federal court
for those actions seems most peculiar, indeed, almost perverse. That, however, may be the legacy left by the 'unflinchingly political' decision to enact the Eleventh Amendment in
order to avoid state liability to British creditors and to loyal114
115

Massey, 56 U Chi L Rev at 62-67 (cited in note 11).
"The amendment sought to create a party based denial of jurisdiction to the federal

courts that sweeps across all the jurisdictional heads of Article Ill." Id at 65 (emphasis in
original).
116 "Far less clear is whether the amendment was also intended to repudiate any implicit waiver of state sovereign immunity contained in the jurisdictional grants of Article III.
If this more ambitious goal was contemplated, it is difficult to understand why it was not
plainly stated, as Representative Sedgwick had initially proposed." Id at 119.
117 Id at 66. The first of these two propositions is not consistent with modern law, and
may never have been the law. Since at least Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436, 447-48 (1883),
state consent to suit has waived any sovereign immunity-based jurisdictional defect in the
federal courts. I suspect that the result in Clark would have been entirely acceptable in the
1790s, even to the adopters of the Eleventh Amendment. The difficulty with the result in
Chisholm was precisely that the state had not consented to suit.
The second proposition is not consistent with modern law. See, for example, Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 456 (1976) (Congress may abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
when acting under the Fourteenth Amendment), and Pennsylvania v Union Gas, 109 S Ct
2273 (1989) (Congress may abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when acting under the Commerce Clause).
118 Id.
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ists seeking to reclaim their seized property.1 "
As I read the historical evidence presented in Professor Massey's article, I understand him to have concluded with certainty
only that the adopters intended to prohibit suits by out-of-staters
and foreigners. Thus, I will confine my historical argument to this
point. In addition to the plain-meaning-of-the-text argument discussed earlier, 120 Professor Massey advances three arguments in
support of his conclusion.
a. The Gallatin proposal. First, Professor Massey points to
language Senator Gallatin of Pennsylvania sought to add to the
amendment. 2 ' At the time of Gallatin's proposal, the amendment
consisted of the text that eventually was adopted. Gallatin would
have had the Eleventh Amendment read as follows (with his proposed language in italics): "The Judicial power of the United
States, except in cases arising under treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States, by citizens of another State, or by citizens or
subjects of any foreign State."1 2 Gallatin's proposal was overwhelmingly defeated. Professor Massey argues that it was defeated
because it would have "permitted precisely the kind of action that
debtor states wished to eliminate," and he relies on this to conclude that the amendment was intended to prohibit suits when
brought by out-of-staters or foreigners.' I view this as Professor
Massey's strongest argument, since he is clearly correct both in
saying that states were significantly concerned by the possibility of
claims based on the peace treaty with Britain, and in reading Gallatin's language as making clear that such treaty-based claims
would be preserved.
Judge Gibbons has anticipated and responded to this argument. 2 4 His view of the political situation is very much like Professor Massey's. The Federalists wanted to assure Britain that the
peace treaty provisions concerning recovery of escheated property
would be enforceable, and Gallatin's amendment would have
greatly assisted in this effort.12 5 The states were sufficiently con1 Id at 67 (footnote omitted).

110 See discussion in text at notes 79-90.
"
12

See note 48.

4 Annals of Congress 30 (Jan 14, 1794) (emphasis indicates additional language proposed by Gallatin).
11"Massey, 56 U Chi L Rev at 114 (cited in note 11).
14 Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1932-38 (cited in note 8).
The only mystery is why Gallatin made the motion. As Judge Gibbons points out,
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cerned about enforcement in cases such as Vassall v Massachusetts, 1 26 then pending in the Supreme Court, that they rejected

Gallatin's amendment. But examine closely what they rejected. If
we read the amendment as merely repealing party-based heads of
jurisdiction, Gallatin's language would have had the effect of preserving that party-based jurisdiction when suit was brought on a
treaty. In Judge Gibbons's words, Gallatin's language was rejected
"because it would have left intact the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over cases such as Vassall v Massachusetts, a party-status suit that simultaneously raised a substantive federal question
1 27
under the treaty.'

Under this reading of the amendment, rejection of Gallatin's
language meant rejection of party-based jurisdiction in treaty
cases. Jurisdiction over treaty suits could still exist under federal
question jurisdiction, however. Two possibilities existed after the
adoption of the amendment. First, § 25 of the Judiciary Act already provided for Supreme Court review of state court decisions
in which a federal claim had been raised and rejected by the state
court. 128 In Judge Gibbons's view, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
was an important political reality, for it allowed the Federalists to
reassure the British that even after the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment the treaty was enforceable in federal court, at least
ultimately, on appeal. 29 Second, there was the possibility that
Congress would pass an original federal question jurisdictional
statute.
I am not comfortable going as far as Judge Gibbons, who argues that the adopters of the Eleventh Amendment specifically intended to allow enforcement under federal question jurisdiction. I
think it is possible that they had this intent, and Judge Gibbons
Gallatin was "not particularly welcome to that Federalist stronghold." Id at 1932.
.2.Unreported, discussed in Jacobs, Eleventh Amendment at 60-62 (cited in note 13).
See discussion at text and note 66.
127 Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1936 (cited in note 8).
128 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 25, 1 Stat 73, 85-87.
229 Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1935-37 (cited in note 8). I am not as confident as
Judge Gibbons that the state courts were then thought to be under the obligation, or to
have the power, to entertain unconsented private suits against the states, even when
brought under federal law. There was no federal statute requiring the state courts to take
federal questions suits that would abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. (Section 25 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 spoke directly to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
not to the original jurisdiction of the state courts, and it said nothing about suits against a
state.) Nor was there any provision of Article III explicitly requiring the state courts to take
unconsented suits against the states. Perhaps under these circumstances, it was thought
that the state courts had no obligation to entertain such suits, and, if they entertained them,
no power to compel the states to appear.
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has carefully and skillfully marshalled considerable evidence in
support of his view. But my reading of the evidence is more cautious. As I see it, the vulnerability of the states to unconsented
suits by private citizens under federal law-in federal or state
court-was an unresolved matter when the Eleventh Amendment
was adopted.1 30
But Judge Gibbons's argument about Gallatin's proposal comports with my view just as well as with his own. Under either view,
the rejection of Gallatin's language did not mean that the amendment was intended to prohibit suits brought by out-of-staters or
foreigners. It only meant that the adopters did not want to preserve party-based jurisdiction for treaty cases. Indeed, if one views
the amendment as a ringing victory for the anti-Federalists, as
Professor Massey does, my view of the federal question issue
makes the diversity explanation stronger than does Judge Gibbons's view. Under my view, there was some uncertainty about the
power of Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal
question cases, and I am less certain than Judge Gibbons that the
state courts were required to be open to treaty claims. If this is so,
the rejection of Gallatin's amendment left the enforceability of the
treaty in greater doubt than under Judge Gibbons's explanation.
In that event, of course, the anti-Federalists prevailed to a greater
extent than under Judge Gibbons's view of the matter.
b. Protection against unconsented suits. Second, Professor
Massey makes a related argument that Massachusetts, Virginia,
and Georgia would have wanted more security against unconsented
suits than a mere repeal of the state-citizen diversity jurisdiction
would have provided. 13 1 Professor Massey quite rightly points out
that repeal of party-based jurisdiction might have been sufficient
for the moment, but might not have been sufficient in the long run
because Congress could pass a statute conferring original federal
question jurisdiction on the federal courts, causing "all of these
claims (or others very much like them) [to] emerge from their
slumbers and reassert themselves in federal courts."'3 2 But if Professor Massey's reading of the amendment is correct, the adopters
were unaccountably inept. The problem is by now familiar. Since
only suits by out-of-staters and foreigners were prohibited, the
possibility of suits by in-staters was left open, as was the possibility of assignment by out-of-staters and foreigners of their claims to
130 Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1077-78 (cited in note 8).
131 Massey, 56 U Chi L Rev at 114-15 (cited in note
11).
132

Id at 115.
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in-staters.' 3s
Massachusetts, Virginia, and Georgia may have wanted true
security against such suits, but they did not get it. A day after the
Court's decision in Chisholm, Representative Theodore Sedgwick
of Massachusetts introduced the proposed amendment, described
earlier, that would have fully protected the states. Sedgwick's version provided, in language quite different from that of the adopted
version, that "no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant" in any federal court "at the suit of any person or persons
whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any
body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United
States. '134 But the next day a substitute was introduced that limited the amendment to out-of-staters and foreigners, and it is this
language, with the words "be construed" added later, that eventu35
ally became the Eleventh Amendment.
c. Statutory versus constitutional amendment. Finally, Professor Massey argues that had the drafters only intended a repeal
of the party-based jurisdiction that had caused the trouble in
Chisholm, a repeal of § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 would have
accomplished that result. 36 A constitutional amendment, according to Professor Massey, was not necessary. It is not clear how this
argument refutes the diversity explanation. That the adopters
chose a constitutional repeal rather than a statutory repeal of the
state-citizen jurisdiction means only that they chose one manner of
repeal over another.
Even though proponents of the diversity explanation need not
explain why a constitutional rather than a statutory repeal was
chosen, there is an obvious explanation."" At the time, considerable doubt existed about whether § 13 was necessary for the Supreme Court to exercise state-citizen party-based jurisdiction. Jus"'

See text at notes 102-09. Professor Massey does not discuss the assignment problem.

He could defend his position, at least to some degree, by pointing out that he is not as sure
as Professor Lawrence Marshall that suits by in-staters were intended to be preserved. If
the vulnerability of the states to federal question suits by in-staters was unclear, then the
foolishness of speaking only to out-of-staters and foreigners is less obvious.
13 See text at notes 45-46.
"' 3 Annals of Congress 651-52 (Feb 20, 1793). Given the sparseness of the record, it is
unclear whether Sedgwick regarded the rejection of his proposal as a serious defeat. We do
know that Sedgwick voted to approve the amendment in its final form. 4 Annals of Congress 477 (March 4, 1794).
'36Massey, 56 U Chi L Rev at 115-16 (cited in note 11).
137In addition to the argument advanced in the text, another possible explanation is
that Congress wished to remove not only the jurisdiction under the existing statute, but also
the possibility that such a statute could be passed later. However, I am not aware of any
evidence that specifically speaks to this suggestion.

Eleventh Amendment

1989]

1289

tice Iredell, dissenting in Chisholm, had argued that statutory
implementation of the constitutional grant was necessary, and he
based his dissent on the failure of § 13 (as he read it) to confer
that jurisdiction. 138 Iredell objected to Attorney General Randolph's argument before the Court in Chisholm that the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction was self-executing-in Randolph's
words, that the Supreme Court "is to exercise all the judicial power
vested in it by the constitution, by its own authority, whether the
legislature has prescribed methods of doing so, or not."' 1 9 The four
justices who voted in favor of the jurisdiction in Chisholm discussed neither § 13 nor the disagreement between Iredell and Randolph. Thus, the Attorney General of the United States appears to
have thought the jurisdiction self-executing, and four of the five
justices of the Supreme Court may have agreed with him. 40 Under
the circumstances, one could readily understand why members of
Congress wishing to repeal the state-citizen party-based jurisdiction would have done so by constitutional amendment.' 4 ' Merely
repealing § 13 would have invited a reaffirmance of Chisholm.
B.

Response to Professor William Marshall

Professor William Marshall contends that the "core concern
that the eleventh amendment was intended to reflect" was the pro14 2
tection of "state treasuries against any federal court intrusion.'
In his view, the "diversity theorists" have not met the burden of
proving that "a proper historical understanding [of the amend13'
See

text at notes 39-44.

139 2 US (2 Dall) at *432. Randolph argued, "1st. That the constitution vests a jurisdic-

tion in the supreme court over a state, as a defendant, at the suit of a private citizen of
another state. 2d. That the judicial act recognises [sic] that jurisdiction." Id at *420 (emphasis added). See also id at *426 ("The judicial act recognises [sic] the jurisdiction over
states.").
140 Professor Clinton's careful analysis of Chisholm accords with my reading of the
opinions. Professor Clinton would go farther, contending that at least Justice Wilson affirmatively agreed with Randolph's argument. Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal
Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional
Plan, 86 Colum L Rev 1515, 1563-68 (1986).
141 Professor Jackson has advanced the same explanation for the overruling of
Chisholm by constitutional amendment. Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 45 and n 184 (cited in note
8) (noting that counsel in Rhode Island v Massachusetts, 37 US (12 Pet) 657, 699 (1838),
relied on this explanation), and 49 n 195. I do not regard it as established that, in fact, the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was intended by the framers to be self-executing. I do
regard it as relatively clear, however, that four of the five justices in Chisholm might reasonably have been thought by the adopters of the Eleventh Amendment to have held that
opinion.
1I W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1396 (cited in note 10) (emphasis added).
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ment] establishes that states should not be immune from federal
question suits for monetary relief in federal court."'1 43 My response
may seem somewhat odd, given that I am one of the "diversity

theorists," but I agree with most of Professor William Marshall's
arguments. I respond in this way for two reasons. First, the diversity explanation, as he describes it, goes beyond what I believe can
be conclusively demonstrated to have been intended by the adopte'rs of the amendment. Hence, I agree that the adopters cannot be
shown to have had a fully formed intent to preserve federal question suits. Second, some of Professor William Marshall's arguments seek to establish propositions that I see as both true and
entirely, consistent with the diversity explanation.
1.

Poor drafting.

Professor William Marshall begins by stating that the amendment is badly drafted. He thinks it quite unlikely that the adopters of the amendment intended to prohibit suits by out-of-staters
and foreigners, while at the same time leaving suits by in-staters
unaffected.14 4 He does not quite endorse the Court's decision in
Hans v Louisiana,4 5 which held that the Eleventh Amendment
bars unconsented suits brought by in-state citizens, but he thinks
that the adopters of the amendment failed to say what they meant:
"Unfortunately, the wording of the amendment reflects the haste
46
with which it was proposed."'
Professor William Marshall's assumption that the text of the
amendment is the result of ill-considered drafting is probably
wrong. If he is arguing that the drafters were too hurried to consider their words carefully, the timetable in the record contradicts
him. 4 7 The first proposed amendment to overturn Chisholm was
introduced in the House by Representative Sedgwick on February
19, 1793, the day after Chisholm was announced. A second version
was introduced the next day. Congress adjourned on March 4 without taking further action. Congress reconvened on December 2,
1793. On January 2, 1794, a third version of the amendment was
proposed in the Senate. On January 14, Senator Gallatin's
143

Id at 1375.
at 1378.

144 Id

14
134 US 1 (1890). "Hans divorced the text of the eleventh amendment from its interpretation. Yet, even if the eleventh amendment's text can be overlooked, a glaring lack of
any other textual support for the position that states are immune from federal court suits
based on federal law remains." W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1380 (cited in note 10).
146 W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1378 (cited in note 10).
14 See text at notes 44-53.
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proposal to add the language discussed above 14 8 was defeated. An
unknown senator immediately thereafter proposed the addition of
other language, which was also defeated. 149 The final version of the
amendment was approved by the Senate on the same day. One attempt was made to add language in the House on March 4, 1794,
but that was also defeated. 150 The amendment then passed the
House on the same day. In sum, just over a year elapsed between
the introduction of the first proposal and the approval of the final
version. During that time, a total of six different versions were considered. Although the initial reaction to Chisholm-Representative
Sedgwick's proposed amendment-was "immediate and hostile,"''
the drafting process as a whole was relatively deliberate.
Professor William Marshall's bad drafting argument may also
rest on the assumption that it is implausible that the adopters
wished to prohibit suits by out-of-staters and foreigners, and at the
same time to leave in-staters unaffected. I agree that this is implausible, but one would conclude that the drafting was careless
only if one reads the amendment as prohibiting jurisdiction. As we
have seen, other amendments proposed in the early 1800s provide
fairly strong evidence that the adopters understood the language to
repeal rather than prohibit party-based jurisdiction.5 2 If we understand the language of the amendment as only a repeal, then
out-of-staters, foreigners, and in-staters are treated identically:
there is no party-based jurisdiction for any of them. One can thus
conclude both that the words of the amendment were chosen with
care, and that the adopters did not intend to distinguish among
the various kinds of possible plaintiffs.
2.

The possibility of federal question based suits.

Professor William Marshall then attacks three arguments in
support of the diversity explanation. First, he attacks the argument that the adopters of the amendment focused only on the
state-citizen diversity clause, and were not greatly concerned by
the possibility of suits brought against the states under federal
law. 153 I made this argument in its most emphatic form in 1983.'"
148 See text at notes 121-31.
149 Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1933 (cited in note 8).
150 Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1059 (cited in note 8).
'l Id at 1058. See also W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1377 (cited in note 10) ("As

commentators are fond of saying, the reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia was 'swift and
hostile.' ").
See discussion, text at notes 82-90.

1 W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1381-83 (cited in note 10).
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Since writing that article, however, I have been convinced 155 that
the adopters were conscious of the possibility of suits brought
against the states under federal law, primarily claims under the
5
1783 peace treaty with the British.1 1
Judge Gibbons has concluded that the, adopters were not only
conscious of these suits, but affirmatively intended to preserve federal court jurisdiction, particularly the'existing Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions in federal question
suits under § 25 of the Judiciary Act. As I indicated earlier, I am
not yet convinced that the adopters were affirmatively addressing
that question. 57 It seems to me at least as likely that they were
simply postponing it. As things turned out, the treaty-based claims
were soon shunted off to an international commission, so the Supreme Court was never asked under its § 25 jurisdiction whether
the states were required to entertain in their own courts unconsented treaty-based suits.' 5 Further, although the issue of the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and federal question
jurisdiction was raised in several cases before the Civil War, the
15 9
Supreme Court never resolved it.
It now appears to me that Professor William Marshall is right
that the adopters of the amendment were conscious of the federal
question suits that would certainly be brought if Chisholm were
left standing, and that might well be brought if federal question
suits were not forbidden. But this does not mean that they intended the amendment to prohibit such suits. Recall that the
adopters rejected Representative Sedgwick's original version of the
amendment, which would have protected the states from all suits.
The states were concerned about the protection of their treasuries,
as Professor William Marshall says, but the diversity explanation
of the amendment is consistent with that concern. After the repeal
of the party-based jurisdiction, the treasuries were in fact protected, since there was, at least for the time being, no statutory
I54

Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1077-78 (cited in note 8).

See Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1926-41 (cited in note 8).
In my earlier article, I foolishly suggested that foreigners were included in the
amendment in part because of the rumor (false, as it turned out) that the plaintiff in
Chisholm had been British. Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1045 n 52 (cited in note 8). It is now
'clear to me, thanks to Judge Gibbons, that the claims of British subjects under the peace
treaty were the concern.
'1 See text at note 130.
158 Gibbons, 83 Colun L Rev. at 1940 (cited in note 8). I think it possible the Supreme
Court would have held that the states were not required to do so. See note 129.
119 Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1083-87 (cited in note 8); Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at
1941-68 (cited in note 8); and Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 15-25 (cited in note 8).
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grant of original federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal
courts. There was the long and uncertain route through the state
courts and up to the Supreme Court under § 25, but it had not
been tested in a suit for money brought under federal law.6 0
3.

The "Plan of the Convention."

Professor William Marshall also attacks the argument that the
"plan of the convention" required the preservation of unconsented
suits against the states to enforce federal law.' 6 ' He first makes the
attack in general terms, 1 62 but then narrows it to an attack on the
argument that the adopters intended to preserve the ability to sue
the states for damages under federal law. 6i Professor Marshall has
put his finger on a sensitive point. He is clearly correct that the
framers of the Constitution and the adopters of the Eleventh
Amendment were very concerned about unconsented suits against
the states for damages. For example, Hamilton had argued in Federalist 81164 that the state-citizen diversity clause did not mean
that state indebtedness to individuals would be subject to compulsory suit in federal court. A damage suit had been at issue in
Chisholm, and of course the amendment was intended specifically
to change the outcome in that case. Moreover, Justice Iredell had
specifically said that he thought every part of the Constitution
could be given full effect without authorizing suits "for the recov160
The

Court did subsequently hear Cohens v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264 (1821),

which is commonly cited today for the proposition that the Supreme Court is not limited by
the Eleventh Amendment in cases coming up from the state courts. As Professor Jackson is
careful to point out, this is an extreme overreading of Cohens. Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 15
(cited in note 8). The Court in Cohens held only that it could hear a writ of error in a
criminal case, where defendants claimed a violation of a federal right.
161W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1383-89 (cited in note 10). Professor Marshall notes
that Justice Brennan referred to the "plan of the convention" in Atascadero State Hospital
o Scanlon, 473 US 234, 280 (1985) (Brennan dissenting). Professor Marshall characterizes

the "plan of the convention" argument as positing "that the participation of the state in the
constitutional compact inherently required the states to submit to the constitutional limits
imposed by that compact, including the limits imposed by the federal government pursuant
to its delegated powers."
I'll W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1384-85 (cited in note 10).
163 Id at 1384, 1385 ("[T]here is considerable evidence that the 'plan of the convention'
position ... was not consistent with the framers' views of state susceptibility to suits for
monetary relief.... Most critically, however, the 'plan of the convention' theory ignores that
the central objection to Chisholm, as well as the general objection to federal jurisdiction
raised in the constitutional debates, was the fear of federal judicial invasion of state
treasuries.").
164 Federalist 81 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers481, 487-88
(New Am Lib, 1961). See also Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1047-48 n 63-64 (cited in note 8);
Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1910-11 (cited in note 8).
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ery of money.' 1' 6 5
I take Professor William Marshall's position to be that if the
issue had been squarely presented in the 1790s or early 1800s, the
Supreme Court may well have allowed federal question suits for
prospective relief, but not for the recovery of money. Judge Gibbons argues that the adopters specifically intended to allow suits
for the recovery of money under the peace treaty. 6 ' Professor
Amar argues that if a damage remedy was necessary for the implementation of a constitutional right, the amendment should not be
understood as eliminating that remedy. 167 And I have argued that
if it were within the federal legislative power to provide for a damage remedy against the states, the federal judicial power would
have extended as far as the legislative power. 168 But Professor William Marshall may be right. We simply cannot know, for the question was never squarely presented. 169 In the end, however, I understand William Marshall to accept the proposition that the
amendment did not affect federal question jurisdiction. The critical issue for him is what remedies were to be permitted under the
federal question jurisdiction, which is quite a different matter from
arguing that federal question jurisdiction was foreclosed altogether
by the amendment.
I am not sure whether the adopters of the amendment specifically intended to allow suits for damages under federal law. There
is evidence on both sides. The adopters clearly knew that there
were suits for the recovery of money waiting to be brought, and
that Vassall v Massachusetts70 was already filed. But just as
clearly, the amendment itself did not forbid the bringing of suits
based on federal law. It certainly did not do so for in-state citizens;
and as I understand the amendment, it did not do so for out-ofstaters and foreigners. The questions left unanswered were
whether federal question jurisdiction, acting without the assistance
of the state-citizen diversity clause, could subject the states to unconsented suits under federal law; and if federal question suits
169 2 US (2 Dall) at *449 (Iredell dissenting).

Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1934-36 (cited in note 8).
Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1484-92 (cited in note 8).
18 Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1074 (cited in note 8).
169 Moreover, even if the question had been addressed, we would have trouble fitting an
answer from the 1790s or 1800s into our modern system, given that damage judgments were
then much more freely available against state officers than they are today. David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U Colo L Rev 1,
41 (1972).
170 Unreported, discussed in Jacobs, Eleventh Amendment at 60-62 (cited in note 13).
166
167
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could be brought, under what provisions of federal law and for
what remedies? As we know from modern law, these are exceedingly complicated and multifarious questions. 17 1 And, as I read the
rather sparse historical evidence, these questions were not intended to be answered by the Eleventh Amendment.
4. The Eleventh Amendment and the source of law.
Finally, Professor William Marshall attacks an argument advanced by Professor Amar in support of the diversity explanation. 172 Professor Amar has argued that in Chisholm the Supreme
Court held that Georgia could not claim sovereign immunity in a
suit based on its own law. In so doing, he argued, it either misapplied state law, or improperly usurped state law by applying the
court federal common law. 7 3 In either event, the Court violated §
34 of the Judiciary Act174 and the principle that led to Erie Railroad v Tompkins.' 75 The Eleventh Amendment was passed, Pro-

fessor Amar concluded, to correct this mistake. Professor William
Marshall contends that this argument is an anachronistic anticipation of Erie. I agree.
Professor William Marshall is obviously correct that we must
deal with jurisprudential categories as they were used in the 1790s
rather than as they are used in the twentieth century. At the time
of Chisholm, the federal courts understood § 34 of the Judiciary
Act merely to declare what the practice would have been in the
absence of the section-that the federal courts would apply
whatever law was appropriate to the case at hand. In the majority
of cases, the appropriate law was the "common law" (what we
would today more readily call the "general common law"). 76 At

the time, the common law was not "state law," which was understood to be local law that covered matters either not comprised
within the common law or that deviated from the common law.
171 See, for example, discussion in Field II, 126 U Pa L Rev at 1209-1277 (cited in note

7); Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1087-1130 (cited in note 8); and Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 72126 (cited in note 8).
172 W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1390-95 (cited in note 10). Professor Amar's argument is in 96 Yale L J at 1470-75 and n 202 (cited in note 8).
1
Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1474 (cited in note 8).
174Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 34, 1 Stat 73, 92, which provides: "That the laws of
the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States
shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as the rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply."
171

304 US 64 (1938).
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Fletcher, 97 Harv L Rev at 1515 n 9 (cited in note 68).
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Nor was the common law federal law that could supplant (or, in
modern terminology, preempt) state law. Common law was rather
a general law shared by the American states and followed voluntarily by them. The underlying contract dispute in Chisholm was
treated by the Court as a question of common law rather than as1 a7
question of local (or state) law, or as a question of federal law. "
All this is consistent with the diversity explanation of the Eleventh
Amendment.
The Court in Chisholm held that Georgia could be compelled
to appear to defend the common law contract suit brought by an
out-of-state citizen. Whether Georgia was actually liable on this
contract under the common law was not decided by the Court, but
I think it a fair reading of Chisholm (and of the reaction of those
who adopted the Eleventh Amendment) that the Court's holding
meant that Georgia would have no defense to the contract based
on the fact of its sovereignty. That is, after Chisholm Georgia's
sovereign immunity defense was unavailable and it would have to
defend the suit in much the same fashion as a private defendant.
The source for the Court's holding that Georgia's sovereign immunity was abrogated was not the common law, but rather the only
federal law with bearing on the case-the state-citizen diversity
clause. That clause abrogated the sovereign immunity of a state
whenever a suit was brought under the party-based jurisdiction
specified in the clause. The adopters of the Eleventh Amendment
reacted in a perfectly rational way to Chisholm, by repealing the
federal question jurisdictional provision that was the source of the
abrogation.
In order to understand the significance of the repeal of the
state-citizen diversity clause, we need to divide sovereign immunity into several components. In my earlier article, I set out a
lengthy analysis of how these components should bear on our understanding of the Eleventh Amendment." 8 I will give only a summary here, but it should be enough to explain how it can simultaneously be true that Professor Marshall is right that we must
understand the amendment by reference to the categories of law
used in the 1790s, and that the adopters intended only to repeal
the jurisdictional grant in the state-citizen diversity clause.
In general, sovereign immunity is the ability of a sovereign legitimately to refuse to submit to judicial process in a suit brought
17 See, for example, 2 US (2 Dali) at *453, *458, *465, and *466 (1793) (Wilson). See

also W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1391 n 107 (cited in note 10).
18 Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1063-78 (cited in note 8).
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against it. One of the components of that sovereign immunity is
the ability to object to suit by any private person. In the United
States after the adoption of the Constitution, this component
could be further broken down into subcomponents depending on
the source of the cause of action and on the court in which the suit
is filed. We are here concerned with suits in federal court that
could be brought under either common law or state law (i.e., nonfederal law), or under federal law. 179 Chisholm was a suit of the
first type, brought under the common law. The Eleventh Amendment, in overruling Chisholm, repealed the grant of jurisdiction
that had required the state to submit to suit under the common
law, and thus prevented the federal government from finding that
a state had given up its sovereign immunity in suits brought under
non-federal law.
Suits brought under federal law were something else again. In
these suits, the issue was not whether a state should be bound by
non-federal law (including both local state law and common law,
which it could change or depart from whenever it chose). Rather,
the issue was whether a state could be judicially compelled to obey
the law of a superior sovereign. The federal law question, unlike
the Chisholm question, was whether the states in subscribing to
the Constitution gave up their sovereign immunity to suits brought
under the new federal law that was created or authorized by the
new Constitution. These questions are so different that it is implausible that the adopters of the Eleventh Amendment should
have thought that the answer to the first question necessarily entailed the answer to the second.
CONCLUSION

Professor Lawrence Marshall writes that the diversity theorists appear to claim that they have "incontrovertible evidence" to
support their explanation of the Eleventh Amendment.18 0 Evidence
of that character would be surprising here, where the historical
record is so sparse and the questions so complicated. Yet, despite
the absence of such evidence, the diversity explanation seems to
me demonstrably superior to any competing explanation: the
179

Id at 1070. To some degree, the argument here depends on an understanding of the

relationship among federal law, general common law, and local state law that I developed in
an article that was in manuscript when my Eleventh Amendment article went to press.
Fletcher, 97 Harv L Rev 1513 (cited in note 68). See W. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1393 n
118 (cited in note 10) (citing this article).
11oL. Marshall, 102 Harv L Rev at 1350 (cited in note 11).
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amendment was intended to require a narrower construction of the
grant of jurisdiction contained in the state-citizen diversity clause
and the state-foreigner diversity clause. After the adoption of the
amendment, the federal courts no longer had party-based jurisdiction when an out-of-state citizen, or a foreign citizen or subject,
sued a state. The amendment was not intended to prohibit jurisdiction in such cases, however. Other heads of jurisdiction-federal
question jurisdiction and admiralty jurisdiction, in particular-were not disturbed.
The question of greatest interest to many modern scholars is
whether the states were intended to have sovereign immunity from
suits brought by private individuals under federal law. The diversity explanation does not directly answer that question. Rather, it
tells us that the answer cannot be found in the Eleventh Amendment at all. Whatever judicial power existed under the other heads
of jurisdiction before the passage of the amendment continued to
exist after its passage. Some scholars, most prominently Judge
Gibbons and Professor Amar, believe that federal question jurisdiction clearly entailed, at the time of the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, an abrogation of the sovereign immunity of the states
in federal court. For my own part, I think that it was a difficult
and unresolved question that was left by the framers, as well as by
the adopters of the Eleventh Amendment, to be answered as the
meaning of the Constitution unfolded.
I suggested in my earlier article what the consequences might
be if the diversity explanation of the amendment is accepted as the
best available historical account, and if that explanation is permitted to have a significant role in shaping modern doctrine.' 8 ' I will
focus here only on the ability to sue a state in federal court under
the federal question jurisdiction.'" Some "diversity theorists" believe that the framers of the Constitution and the adopters of the
amendment specifically intended for there to be an abrogation of
the states' sovereign immunity under the federal question jurisdic8I Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1091-1130 (cited in note 8). The three consequences I do
not discuss here are: (1) that state sovereign immunity would not be analogized to ordinary
federal court subject matter jurisdiction under Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry.
v Swan, 111 US 379 (1884); Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1091-93 (cited in note 8); (2) that it
would be unnecessary to decide whether the states can be compelled to hear private suits
against themselves in their own courts under Testa v Katt, 330 US 386 (1947); Fletcher, 35
Stan L Rev at 1093-99 (cited in note 8); and (3) that the present distinction between a state,
which is protected by the amendment, and its subdivisions, which are not, would become
much less important, 35 Stan L Rev at 1099-1107 (cited in note 8).
182 Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev at 1108-1130 (cited in note 8).
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tion.' ss Other "diversity theorists," including me, believe that the
question of the states' sovereign immunity under the federal question jurisdiction was left open by the framers and the adopters.""
Finally, "Congressional abrogation theorists" believe that the
amendment (and the idea for which it stands) was intended to prohibit suits by private individuals, but to permit Congress to abrogate that immunity by legislation. 1 85 The majority of the Supreme
Court apparently still believes that the amendment forbids jurisdiction for out-of-staters and foreigners, and that Hans v Louisiana8' filled in a missing term when it extended the prohibition to
8
in-staters.1 7
Oddly enough, all ways of thinking about the amendment have
led more or less to the same place. The "diversity theorists" get
there fairly directly, the "Congressional abrogation theorists" a little less so, and the Supreme Court less directly still. But they all
conclude that there is nothing in the history of the Eleventh
Amendment to prevent the federal government from providing for
unconsented suits against the states under federal law, even when
the remedy includes an order for the recovery of money directly
from the state treasury. There are differences among these theories
and their implications, but it is striking that the theories, and the
results reached by the Supreme Court, all confirm the fundamental
insight of the diversity explanation: private suits against a state
under its own law should be the affair of the state and its own
courts, but suits under federal law are quite another matter. Today
we have come to believe that inherent in the Constitution is the
congressional power to authorize federal courts to enforce federal
law against the states at the instance of private individuals who are
supposed to be protected by those laws. There is disagreement
over what federal laws should control the states, what constitutional provisions they should be based upon, and what remedies
should be available. But that there should be such suits, and that
the remedies made available should be meaningful implementations of the federal rights at issue, are beyond substantial debate.
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Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1466-75 (cited in note 8); Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1899

(cited in note 8).
,' Field I, 126 U Pa L Rev at 534-36, 543-45 (cited in note 7); Fletcher, 35 Stan L Rev
at 1068-69, 1077-78 (cited in note 8); and possibly Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 1 (cited in note

8).

185 Nowak, 75 Colum L Rev at 1422 (cited in note 8); Tribe, 89 Harv L Rev at 693
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,86 134 US 1 (1890).
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